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IN THE UTAH COURT OF \PPEALS 
S I M I Ol UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
TREN SHELDON HORR «
 : ( us. \<i >lllli.in,N < \ 
Defendant S|• |M Hint. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDMTION VM) N S II KFOI l'KO( I I IHNCS 
This is an appeal from two convictions for criminal non-support, both third degree 
felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004). This Court has 
ji.i LSdi.ti.):; ui me appeal under UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (West 2004). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion s " that defendant 
failed to show that a state-paid accountant was "necessary for an effective delense" 
mhhi I i wH <ihi Vixi-i i) n-1 P HI'MH^i >l '"II 11 ' 
Standard of review. A trial court's disposition of a defendant's request for a state-
paid expert is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. See, e.g, Alverson v. State, 983 P.2d 
498, 511 n. 34 (Okla. App. 1999); Commonwealth v. Serge, 896 A.2d 1170, 1184-1185 
!Vnr. "''iMM. cert, denied, 111 S.Ct. 275 [Oct 2, 2006); State v. Anderson, 655 P.2d 
1196, 1198 (Wash. App. 1982). Cf. State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 
1994) (reviewing trial court's disposition of request for a state-paid investigator for abuse 
of discretion (citing State v. Cabututan, 861 P.2d 408, 411-12 (Utah 1993)). 
2. Did the trial court properly exercise its discretion to deny defendant's 
motion to sever two charges of criminal non-support? 
Standard of review. A trial court's denial of a motion to sever charges is reviewed 
for an abuse of discretion. State v. Mead, 2001 UT 58, ^  59, 27 P.3d 1115. "'A denial of 
severance will only be reversed [on appeal] if it is affirmatively shown that a defendant's 
right to a fair trial has been impaired."' Id. at f^ 54 (quoting State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 
440, 445 (Utah 1986)). 
3, Should this Court review defendant's inadequately briefed claim that the 
trial court committed plain error in not sua sponte recusing itself for alleged bias? 
Defendant raises this unpreserved claim under the plain error doctrine. Aplt. Br. at 
1,10. To show plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an error 
that was both obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24, 122 P.3d 543. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004): 
(1) A person commits criminal nonsupport if, having a spouse, a child, or 
children under the age of 18 years, he knowingly fails to provide for the 
support of the spouse, child, or children when any one of them: 
(a) is in needy circumstances; or 
(b) would be in needy circumstances but for support received from a 
source other than the defendant or paid on the defendant's behalf. 
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(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3), criminal nonsupport is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
(3) Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the actor: 
(a) has been convicted one or more times of nonsupport, whether in 
this state, any other state, or any court of the United States; 
(b) committed the offense while residing outside of Utah; or 
(c) commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months 
within any 24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000. 
(4) For purposes of this section "child" includes a child born out of 
wedlock whose paternity has been admitted by the actor or has been 
established in a civil suit. 
(5)(a) In a prosecution for criminal nonsupport under this section, it is an 
affirmative defense that the accused is unable to provide support. 
Voluntary unemployment or underemployment by the defendant does not 
give rise to that defense. . . . 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-l (West 2004): 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief 
as justice requires. . . . 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charge. Defendant was charged with two counts of criminal non-support, both 
third degree felonies, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-201 (West 2004). R107-
04. 
Conviction. Following a two-day jury trial, defendant was convicted as charged. 
R340. 
Sentence. On 22 August 2006, the trial court imposed two consecutive prison 
terms of zero to five years. R381. The trial court suspended the statutory prison terms 
and placed defendant on a ten-year term of probation, including 120 days jail. R380. The 
trial court also ordered defendant to pay restitution in the amount of $53,017.40, and to 
pay on-going child support in the amount of $457 per month. Id. 
Notice of appeal. Defendant filed a timely notice of appeal on 22 August 2006. 
R391. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant had two children with his first wife, Teresa Warden: Jillyn Eugenia, 
born 4 May 1987, and Kelsey Maureen, born 23 September 1988. R106; R426:203. 
Defendant and Teresa divorced in May 1990. Id. at 203. Defendant was ordered to pay 
child support. Id. at 204, 209, 210. Teresa received defendant's payments through the 
Office of Recovery Services (ORS). Id. at 210, 257. Defendant did not make any 
payments to Teresa that were not reported to ORS. Id. at 214. Defendant did not help 
Teresa with birthdays or holidays and told Teresa that she would "never see any money." 
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Id. at 214-15. According to ORS, defendant owed Teresa $16,850 for the seven-year 
period between August 1997 and July 2004, but ORS had collected only $4,403,98. Id. at 
257-58. 
Defendant had two children with his second wife, Maria Louise Pincock: Ashley 
Louise, born 10 July 1991 (deceased 6 July 2000), and Allie Brianne, born 12 January 
1996. R106; R426:177. Defendant and Maria divorced in September 1994, subsequently 
remarried, and divorced again in May 1998. Id. at 178. Defendant was ordered to pay 
child support. Id. at 178, 252-53. Maria reported any child support payments that she 
received directly from defendant to ORS. Id. at 183. Defendant did not make direct 
payments to Maria "on a regular basis." Id. at 191. Defendant did not help Maria with 
birthdays or holidays and he was "defiant" whenever Maria requested assistance. Id. at 
183-84. Defendant told Maria that if she "didn't get [ORS] to quit garnishing his wages 
he would quit his job so they couldn't garnish wages," and that he "spend[s] a hell of a lot 
of money making sure [she doesn't] know how much money [he] [has]." Id. at 184. 
According to ORS records, defendant owed Maria $28,721 in child support for the 
approximate six-year period between October 1998 and June 2004, but had only paid her 
$9,099.21. M a t 254. Of this money, only $2,426.13 was paid voluntarily. Id. A 
voluntary payment is a payment made through voluntary income withholding or 
personally by the defendant. Id. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Point I. To qualify for state-paid expert assistance, a defendant must show both 
that he is indigent and that the expert assistance is necessary to an effective presentation 
of his defense. While there is no dispute here that defendant was indigent, his cursory 
claims on appeal are inadequate to demonstrate that a state-paid expert was necessary to 
his defense. Even if defendant's claims are deemed adequately briefed, however, they 
lack merit. Defendant claimed below that a state-paid accountant was necessary because 
he had several theories and amortization tables he wished to present to the jury. But 
defendant never identified his alleged theories to the trial court. Defendant also claimed 
that the payment summaries prepared by the State were inaccurate, but he never identified 
any alleged errors in the State's calculations of his arrearages. Given defendant's 
undeveloped assertions of error, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying 
defendant's request for a state-paid accountant. The trial court properly found that the 
type of record keeping defendant described did not require the skills of an accountant; 
thus, it was not necessary to his defense. This sound ruling should be upheld. 
Point II. The trial court properly exercised its discretion to deny defendant's 
motion to sever the charges of criminal non-support. The two charges were properly 
joined, first, because they were connected together in their commission. The time periods 
overlapped by a period of six years and the amount of the child support obligation in one 
case was thus relevant to defendant's ability to pay in the other case. The charges were 
also properly joined because they were alleged to have been part of a common scheme or 
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plan to avoid making any child support payments. The trial evidence was not to the 
contrary. The State introduced evidence that defendant made statements to both his 
former wives that they would not get any money from him or that he was avoiding having 
to pay child support. Finally, defendant suffered no unfair prejudice from the joinder 
because the evidence of non-support was mutually admissible in separate trials. As 
noted, one child support obligation was relevant to determining the amount of the other. 
Further, the evidence of non-support was probative of defendant's disputed motive, intent 
and plan to avoid making any child support payments. The trial court's ruling denying 
the severance motion should thus be upheld. 
Point III. Defendant's claim that the trial court plainly erred in not sua sponte 
recusing itself for bias is inadequately briefed. To prevail under the plain error doctrine, 
defendant has to show obvious and prejudicial error. Although defendant cites to the 
record, he fails to describe or analyze the portions of the record cited, or to demonstrate 
that any bias, let alone obvious and prejudicial bias occurred. Defendant's reliance on the 
two adverse pretrial rulings discussed in Points I and II of his brief is also unavailing. An 
adverse ruling is an inadequate basis for a claim of judicial bias as a matter of law. 
Defendant's claim of bias must therefore be rejected. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
RULING THAT DEFENDANT FAILED TO SHOW THAT A STATE-
PAID ACCOUNTANT WAS NECESSARY FOR AN EFFECTIVE 
DEFENSE 
In Point I of his brief, defendant alleges that the trial court erroneously denied his 
request for the assistance of a state-paid accountant in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 
77-32-302(1) (West 2004). Aplt Br. at 6. Section 77-32-302(1) provides that an indigent 
defendant shall, upon request, "be provided with access to defense resources necessary 
for an effective defense." Defendant's claim should be rejected, first, because it is 
inadequately briefed, and second, because he has never shown that a state-paid accountant 
was necessary to an effective defense. 
A. Defendant's Claim is Inadequately Briefed. 
Defendant challenges the trial court's refusal to appoint an accountant to assist in 
the preparation of his defense. Aplt. Br. at 6. Although defendant attaches his copy of 
the trial court's ruling, his argument is devoid of citation to the record below. His 
analysis is also cursory. Defendant's failure to ground his claim of error in the record and 
to provide meaningful analysis is grounds to reject his claim of error. See Utah R. App. 
P. 24(a)(9), (i), (j). See also State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 1989) (declining 
to review inadequately briefed claim). 
8 
B. An Indigent Defendant is Entitled to State-Paid Expert 
Assistance Where Necessary. 
Even assuming defendant's claim of error is adequately briefed, defendant fails to 
meet his burden under section 77-32-302(1) to show that a state-paid accountant was 
"necessary for an effective defense." 
The State agrees that an indigent defendant is entitled to necessary state-paid 
expert assistance. SeeAke v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 74, 83 (1985) (indigent defendant 
constitutionally entitled to state-paid psychiatrist's assistance when his sanity at time of 
offense is likely significant factor at trial); Little v. Armontrout, 835 F.2d 1240, 1243-44 
(8th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (due process requires state to provide expert assistance to 
indigent defendant who shows reasonable probability that expert would aid defense and 
that denial of expert assistance would result in unfair trial); Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 
1021, 1026 (4th Cir. 1980) (equal protection requires state to provide expert witness to 
indigent defendant who shows expert necessary to resolve substantial question); State v. 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, ^ [52, 979 P.2d 799 (recognizing that due process sometimes 
requires that a defendant be allowed to have own expert examine critical evidence). 
Likewise, section 77-32-302(l)(a), provides that an indigent defendant "shall . . . be 
provided access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if. . . the 
indigent requests . . . defense resources[.]" See also Utah R. Crim. Pro. 15(a) ("Upon 
showing that a defendant is financially unable to pay the fees of an expert whose services 
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are necessary for adequate defense, the witness fee shall be paid as if he were called on 
behalf of the prosecution"). 
Thus, to obtain state-paid expert assistance under the federal constitution, section 
77-32-302(l)(a), or rule 15, a defendant must show not only that he is indigent, but also 
that the expert assistance is necessary to an effective presentation of his defense. See 
section 77-32-302(1 )(a) (requiring payment to indigent defendant only for "defense 
resources necessary for an effective defense"). See also State v. Burns, 2000 UT 56, ^  
32, 4 P.3d 795 (holding "that the only requirements for receiving public assistance for 
expert witnesses are proof of necessity and establishment of indigence"); Bakalov, 1999 
UT 45, f 52 (right to have own expert examine evidence arises only when that evidence is 
"critical" in that it could induce a reasonable doubt); Utah R. Crim. Pro. 15(a) (providing 
only for state-paid experts whose services are "necessary" and when defendant is 
financially unable to pay). 
The State does not dispute that defendant is indigent.1 Defendant, however, has 
never shown a state-paid expert was "necessary for an effective defense" in this case. 
Section 77-32-302(l)(a). 
Neither the prosecutor nor the trial court questioned defendant's indigence. See, 
e.g., R92-89;94; 101. 
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C. Defendant Failed to Establish That a State-Paid 
Accountant Was Necessary to an Effective Defense. 
Before trial, defendant requested the services of a court-appointed accountant. 
R88.2 Defendant alleged that the State's "payment summary regarding the child support 
payments" at issue here contained an unspecified error. Id. Defendant reasoned that he 
needed an "accountant to correctly determine, summarize, and give an amortization chart 
of what has been paid and what[,] if any, needs to be paid." R87. 
The prosecutor objected to defendant's request. R92-89. According to the 
prosecutor, the payment summary or "Debt Computation" prepared by the ORS, and 
admitted at the preliminary hearing on 20 October 2004, reflected "all payments 
received" during the charged period. Id. at 92-91. Moreover, defendant was informed 
"that any receipts which he had could be forwarded to the State, and that if verified, his 
account would be credited." Id. Defendant, however, did not provide any receipts or 
proof of payment for verification until a status hearing held six months later on 19 April 
2005. Id. At that time, defendant presented "copies of certified checks made out to the 
[ORS] for recent payments of child support." Those "payments were verified" and 
credited to defendant's account. Id. Although defendant claimed to have "additional 
proofs of payment that he would forward to the State," the prosecutor indicated that she 
had received no other information regarding alleged payments from defendant. Id. 
2
 A copy of this and other pertinent pleadings, including the trial court's written 
ruling, are attached in addendum A. 
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Accordingly, the prosecutor argued that a review of the ORS's "Debt Computation by an 
accountant would serve no purpose as the Debt Computation merely reflected] what has 
been entered in the ORS system." Id. The prosecutor reiterated that if defendant had 
"additional proofs of payment for which he believe[d] he should receive credit," he could 
still "forward them to the State for verification." Id. Because the prosecutor was willing 
to credit defendant "for all verifiable child support payments," she opined that 
"[defendant's concerns about the total child support arrearage may be able to be resolved 
without cost." Id. The prosecutor thus asked the trial court to deny defendant's request 
for a state-paid accountant, or, alternatively, to order defendant to "provide all alleged 
proofs of payment to the State for verification to see if concerns over the child support 
arrearage can be resolved without incurring additional costs." R90. 
Defendant filed a written reply asserting that he had unspecified "theories that he 
wishe[d] to present at trial," and that he needed a court-appointed accountant to "prepare 
several amortization schedules that he [could] present to the jury." Rl 00-99. Defendant 
further alleged that the payment summaries prepared by the ORS were "inaccurate," but 
did not identify the alleged inaccuracies or amounts. R99. 
The trial court denied defendant's request in a written ruling. R101. The trial 
court found that defendant had failed to demonstrate "how an accountant would assist.. . 
in his defense." Id. The trial court further found that "[t]he records of the State appear to 
be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other than the 
[defendant's own records." Id. The trial court noted that the State had "agreed to give 
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the [djefendant credit for any payments he ha[d] made when he has proof of payment" 
and ruled that "[tjhis record keeping does not require the skills of an accountant." Id. 
(emphasis added). 
As noted, section 77-32-302(1) provides that an indigent defendant "shall . . . be 
provided with access to defense resources necessary for an effective defense, if. . . the 
indigent requests . . . defense resources[.]" (Emphasis added). Here, an indigent 
defendant requested a state-paid accountant to assist in the preparation of his defense, but 
failed to explain why an accountant was "necessary for an effective defense." Id. For 
example, defendant never specifically identified any alleged errors in the State's 
calculation of his arrearages, nor did he identify any of the alleged defense "theories" that 
he asserted required the assistance of a state-paid accountant. R88, 100-99. Rejecting 
defendant's claim that he needed a state-paid accountant to prepare several amortization 
schedules, the trial court agreed with the prosecutor that defendant had not shown that a 
state-paid accountant was necessary to an effective defense. R101; see also R94. 
On appeal, defendant shows no abuse of discretion in the trial court's ruling. Cf 
State v. Hancock, 874 P.2d 132, 135 (Utah App. 1994) ("We will not reverse a trial 
court's disposition of a motion for appointment of an investigator absent a showing that 
the trial court abused its discretion"). Indeed, he does not even challenge the trial court's 
findings that (1) he failed to demonstrate "how an accountant would assist" him "in his 
defense," and that (2) the State was willing "to give [him] credit for any payments he has 
made when he has proof," which "record keeping," the trial court noted, "[did] not 
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require the skills of an accountant." Id. at 101. Moreover, rather than attempt to 
demonstrate prejudice, or to show a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable result if he 
had had a state-paid accountant, defendant merely speculates that "a rigorous examination 
of the State's accounts could have meant the difference between a felony and a 
misdemeanor," and that "[a] sufficient discrepancy in the accounts might have 
undermined the State's credibility entirely." Aplt. Br. at 7 (emphasis added). 
As the trial court's ruling emphasizes, however, the only evidence that could make 
a difference in the amount of defendant's arrearages is additional evidence of payment 
not already credited to defendant. See R101. Such evidence, if it existed, would have 
been available to defendant whether he had a state-paid accountant or not. Certainly, it is 
not the kind of evidence that could be uncovered only by an accountant scrutinizing the 
ORS's computation of defendant's previously established payments. Rather, that task 
could be just as easily be performed by a layperson. Nor is it the kind of evidence likely 
to result from the preparation of alternative amortization schedules. See Rl 00-99. More 
importantly, even assuming that defendant had produced additional proofs of payment 
here, they would have been insufficient to reduce the felony charges to misdemeanors 
unless they established that the total arrearage for either count did not exceed $10,000. 
See section 76-7-20 l(3)(c) ("Criminal nonsupport is a felony of the third degree if the 
actor: . . . commits the crime of nonsupport in each of 18 individual months within any 
24-month period, or the total arrearage is in excess of $10,000"). The ORS here 
calculated an arrearage of $21,718.03 owed to Maria Pincock for the period of October 
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1998 to July 2004, and an arrearage of $13,534.88 owed to Teresa Warden for the period 
of August 1997 to July 2004. See Plaintiffs Exh. ## 1-2. In other words, defendant 
would have had to produce additional proof of payments of more than $11,718.03 with 
regard to count II, and of more than $3,534.88 with regard to count I, to reduce both 
felony charges to misdemeanors. Defendant has never suggested that he possesses such 
proof or that an accountant would have uncovered such discrepancies in the ORS records. 
Finally, unlike the typical case in which a criminal defendant is afforded a state-
paid expert, such as a psychiatrist or psychologist, the basic accounting issue here—the 
amount of defendant's arrearages—is well within the ken of jurors. At bottom, 
defendant's defense entailed little more than adding and subtracting what defendant owed 
and what he had paid. Cf. Ake, 470 U.S. at 81 (observing that psychiatrists "ideally assist 
lay jurors, who generally have no training in psychiatric matters, to make a sensible and 
educated determination about the mental condition of the defendant at the time of the 
offense"); Caldwell v. Mississippi, All U.S. 320, 323 n.l (1985) (no due process 
violation occurred when state refused to appoint a nonpsychiatric expert where an 
indigent Caldwell "offered little more than undeveloped assertions that the requested 
assistance would be beneficial"). See also Little, 835 F.2d at 1244 (recognizing that 'Ake 
and Caldwell taken together hold that a defendant must show more than a mere possibility 
of assistance from an expert. Rather, the defendant must show a reasonable probability 
that an expert would aid in his defense, and that denial of expert assistance would result 
in an unfair trial."); Williams, 618 F.2d at 1026-27 (recognizing that indigent defendant 
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should be afforded state-paid expert where "the subject matter is beyond the 
comprehension of laymen"). 
In sum, defendant's undeveloped assertions of error and speculative claims of 
prejudice are insufficient to show any abuse of discretion in the trial court's denial of his 
request for a state-paid accountant. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS DISCRETION 
TO DENY DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER TWO CHARGES 
OF CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT 
In Point II of his brief, defendant asserts that he was unfairly prejudiced by the trial 
court's refusal to sever two charges of criminal non-support. Aplt. Br. at 7. Defendant's 
claim lacks merit. 
A. Joinder is proper if criminal charges are connected together in 
their commission or alleged to have been part of a common 
scheme or plan, and neither party is prejudiced. 
The issue of whether a trial court must sever criminal charges is governed by 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-8a-l (West 2004), which provides: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the 
same indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the 
offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by 
joinder of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a 
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joinder for trial together, the court shall order an election of separate trials 
of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief 
as justice requires. . . . 
In other words, different offenses are properly charged in a single information 
when they are "connected together in their commission," or "alleged to be part of a 
common scheme or plan," State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 385 (Utah App. 1997), so long 
as evidence of the crimes would be mutually admissible in a separate trials. See State v. 
Mead, 2001 UT 58, \ 59, 27 P.3d 1115. 
B. The charges of criminal non-support were necessarily 
connected together in their commission as the victims are 
all defendant's children; moreover, the charges were also 
alleged to have been part of defendant's scheme to avoid 
paying any child support to his former wives* 
Here, the trial court ruled that the charges of criminal non-support were connected 
together in their commission. R186; see also section 77-8a-l(l)(b).3 The trial court also 
found that the charges were connected together in their commission, given the substantial 
overlap between the offenses. Rl86-85; see also section 77-8a-l(l)(a). Specifically, the 
trial court found that 
a relevant issue in both counts will be the income and expenses of the 
[defendant during the applicable periods of time. Because the time periods 
for each count overlap substantially, [defendant's] obligations and 
payments to one former spouse would be admissible in establishing the 
ability to pay his obligations to the other former spouse. 
Copies of the ruling and other pertinent pleadings are attached in addendum B. 
17 
Rl 85. Finally, the trial court ruled that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced by the 
joinder of the criminal non-support charges because evidence of the two crimes would be 
mutually admissible in separate trials. Id.; see also section 77-8a-l(4)(a). The trial court 
specifically ruled that 
evidence of one count would be admissible at a separate trial on the other 
count for purposes of establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc. 
Therefore, the [djefendant. . . would not be prejudiced by joinder of the 
various counts since evidence of each count would be admissible in a trial 
on either count. 
R185. The trial court ruled correctly. 
First, the charges of criminal non-support were connected together because the two 
periods of non-support overlapped by approximately six years, from October 1998 to 
June 2004. See R426:254, 257-58; R425:511. As found by the trial court, given this 
substantial overlap, "[defendant's] obligations and payments to one former spouse would 
be admissible in establishing the ability to pay his obligations to the other former spouse." 
R185. See UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45-7.4, 78-45-7.6, 78-45-7.7 (West 2004) ("Uniform 
Civil Liability for Support Act," setting forth child support guidelines and mandating that 
"child support previously ordered," be taken into account in determining amount of 
support obligation); see also UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45-7.14 (West 2004) ("Base 
combined child support obligation table and low income table"). See also Utah R. Evid. 
404(b) (allowing "[e]vidence of other crimes, wrongs[,] or acts" for non-character 
purposes). 
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Second, the State alleged that defendant committed both criminal non-support 
offenses "with the common scheme or plan to pay little or no child support for any of his 
children." R121. The trial evidence was not to the contrary. Defendant told Teresa that 
she would "never see any money." R426:215. Similarly, defendant told Maria that if she 
"didn't get [ORS] to quit garnishing his wages he would quit his job so they couldn't 
garnish wages" and that he "spend[s] a hell of a lot of money making sure [she doesn't] 
know how much money [he] [has]." Id. at 184. Thus, the criteria of section 77-8a-l(l) 
are well established here. 
Finally, as noted, these offenses are connected together in their commission 
because the amount of one child support obligation affects the amount of the other; thus, 
evidence of the non-support would be admissible in separate trials. See, e.g., sections 78-
45-7.4, 78-45-7.6, 78-45-7.7, & 78-45-7.14. Moreover, as found by the trial court, the 
fact that defendant failed to make payments to both of his former wives during the same 
six-year period is probative of defendant's disputed motive, intent and plan to avoid 
making his child support payments, and of a lack of mistake. See, e.g., R425:393-447, 
493-497. See also Utah R. Evid. 404(b) (recognizing prior crimes and bad acts are 
admissible for non-character purposes); Mead, 2001 UT 58, f 59 (rejecting claim of 
prejudice where "evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate 
trial") (additional quotation and citations omitted). Thus, evidence of defendant's 
criminal non-support would be admissible in separate trials on the two criminal non-
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support charges here at issue. Id. Defendant therefore fails to demonstrate prejudice in 
the joinder of the charges under section 77-8a-l(4)(a). See Mead, 2001 UT 585 f 59. 
C. Defendant's other claims of error are inadequately 
briefed. 
Notwithstanding the above, defendant disputes that the criminal non-support 
offenses were in fact connected together in their commission because, although they were 
committed during overlapping time periods, they involved "different victims." Aplt. Br. at 
8. Defendant also disputes that the State showed a common scheme or plan because 
criminal non-support is inherently a crime of "omission," but "[a] common scheme or 
plan is in itself an act of commission." Aplt. Br. at 8 ("In fact, [defendant] was merely 
charged with crimes of omission. A common scheme or plan is in itself an act of 
commission."). Defendant cites no supporting authority and provides no meaningful 
analysis of these claims. They may thus be rejected on the ground that they are 
inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Wareham, 772 P.2d at 966 
(declining to reach inadequately briefed claim). 
D. Defendant's other claims of error lack merit. 
In any event, defendant's other claims should also be rejected because they lack 
merit. Teresa and Maria may be different individuals or victims, but they share the 
connection of being former wives of defendant, and their non-supported children—the 
real victims in this case—are all indisputably connected together by the fact that 
defendant is their father. These facts, together with the overlapping time frame for the 
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criminal non-support offenses, are more than sufficient to establish a connection for 
purposes of section 77-8a-l(l). As for defendant's contention that section 77-8a-l(l)(b) 
contemplates only crimes of commission, it also lacks merit. Even assuming that 
defendant's characterization of the statute is supportable, these are more than cases of 
mere inaction or omission. As noted above, the trial evidence established that defendant 
actively schemed or planned to avoid paying any of his child support obligations. See, 
e.g.,R426:184,215. 
The trial court's well-supported ruling denying defendant's severance motion 
should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANT'S CLAIM 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED PLAIN ERROR IN NOT 
SUA SPONTE RECUSING ITSELF FOR BIAS BECAUSE IT IS 
INADEQUATELY BRIEFED 
In Point III of his brief, defendant asserts that the "the trial judge had a bias against 
[him]." Aplt. Br. at 10. According to defendant, it is "difficult to say with precision 
exactly when the bias became apparent," thus, he acknowledges that he did not comply 
with rule 29(c)(1), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, which requires a party alleging bias 
to move to disqualify the judge at issue within 20 days of discovering the alleged bias.4 
specifically, the rule 29(c)(1)(A) provides that "[a] party to any action or the 
party's attorney may file a motion to disqualify a judge." Rule 29(c)(l)(B)(iii) further 
provides that "[t]he motion shall be filed after commencement of the action, but not later 
than 20 days after . . . the date on which the moving party learns or with the exercise of 
reasonable diligence should have learned of the grounds upon which the motion is based." 
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Aplt. Br. at 10. Given his failure to preserve this issue, defendant asks this Court to reach 
his claim of bias under the doctrine of plain error. Id. Defendant's claim of judicial bias, 
let alone obvious and prejudicial judicial bias, is inadequately briefed and should be 
rejected on that ground. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show "that the trial court committed an 
error that was both obvious and prejudicial." State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ^ f 24, 122 P.3d 
543. Defendant asserts that an alleged pattern of bias "emerges" in this case from the two 
adverse pretrial rulings discussed in Points I and II of his brief, and from the record as a 
whole. Aplt. Br. at 10 (citing R101, 188-84, andR425:5-12, 34-37, 39-41, 182-83, 213, 
219, 262-63, 272,285, and R426:389, 449, 453). While defendant cites to the record, he 
engages in no description of the parts of the record cited, let alone any analysis or 
explanation of the alleged bias that occurred there, or why it was both obvious and 
prejudicial. See Cruz, 2005 UT 45, \ 24. His claim of obvious and prejudicial judicial 
bias is thus inadequately briefed. Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); see also Wareham, 772 P.2d 
at 966. 
In any event, to the extent that defendant's allegation of bias is based on the trial 
court's adverse pretrial rulings, his claim is frivolous on its face. As demonstrated in 
Points I and II of the State's brief, the trial court's pretrial rulings are well-supported in 
the record. Moreover, the fact that the adverse rulings were made pretrial, or outside the 
jury's presence, undermines defendant's claim of bias. In State v. Alonzo, 973 P.2d 975, 
979-80 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court affirmed this Court's holding that Alonzo 
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failed to show prejudice based on the trial court's refusal to recuse itself where allegedly 
biased statements were made before trial, in chambers, and outside the jury's presence. 
Finally, an adverse ruling is an inadequate basis for a claim of judicial bias a matter of 
law. See In re Affidavit of Bias, 947 P.2d 1152, 1154 (Utah 1997) (Zimmerman, C.J., 
sitting alone) (citing 46 Am.Jur.2d Judges § 219 (1994)). Defendant's allegation of 
obvious and prejudicial bias is therefore frivolous on its face. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's jury convictions for felony criminal non-support should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on Jj_ September 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Utah Attorney General 
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Bryan Sidwell (7625) 
Attorney for Defendant 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, ] 
Plaintiff, ] 
v. ] 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, ; 
Defendant. ] 
) MOTION FOR FUNDS TO 
) HIRE ACCOUNTANT 
) Case No. 041800326 FS 
) Judge PAYNE 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and requests an 
Order granting the defendant funds to hire an accountant that can be called as an expert witness 
at his trial. Grounds for such motion are set forth below. 
1. The Defendant is indigent and has a court appointed attorney and is in need of funds. 
2. The State of Utah has proved the defendant with discovery. As part of the discovery 
that State of Utah has included a payment summary regarding the child support payments that the 
defendant has paid to the victim. 
3. The defendant believes that there has been an error with the payments as provided by 
the State of Utah. 
1 
4. The defendant needs to hire an accountant to correctly determine, summarize and give 
an amortization chart of what has been paid and what if any, needs to be paid. 
DATED this ^ d a y of ftwd-- , 2006. 
Bryan Srowell 
Attorney for Defendant 
2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the 
following by hand delivery on March 7, 2006. 
Ann Rozycki 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
BryanJSidwell 
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MAR 1 5 2008 
ANN ROZYCKL #7609 
Assistant Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF #4666 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
Attorneys for State of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. BOX 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801)366-0199 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO MOTION 
FOR FUNDS TO HIRE 
ACCOUNTANT 
Criminal No. 041800326FS 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
The State of Utah, through counsel, Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney General, files 
this response to the DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR FUNDS TO HIRE ACCOUNTANT. 
1. As part of Discovery in this case the State provided to Defendant in September 2004, a Debt 
Computation which is a record of all payments received by the Office of Recovery Services. 
Updated Debt Computations have been provided through out the proceedings. 
2. The Debt Computation reflects all payments noted on the Office of Recovery Services 
Information System. 
fcl y 
JOANNE McKEE, CLERK 
BY dJj^ ^DEPUTY 
3. At the Preliminary Hearing on October 20, 2004, the Defendant, through counsel, indicated that 
he believed he had made child support payments through the Office of Recovery Services for which 
he had not received credit. Defendant was informed by the Prosecutor and by Roberta Casados, 
Criminal Specialist, Office of Recovery Services, that any receipts which he had could be forwarded 
to the State, and that if verified, his account would be credited. 
4. Defendant never provided receipts or proof of payment for verification. 
5. At the Status hearing on April 19, 2005, the Defendant brought copies of certified checks made 
out to the Office of Recovery Services for recent payments of child support. Those payments were 
verified and the Defendant's account reflects credit for them. 
6. At that hearing, the Defendant indicated that he had additional proofs of payment that he would 
forward to the State. No information was forwarded. 
7. A review of the Debt Computation by an accountant would serve no purpose as the Debt 
Computation merely reflects what has been entered in the ORS system. 
8. If the Defendant has additional proofs of payment for which he believes he should receive credit, 
he may still forward them to the State for verification. If child support payments have been made 
which have not yet been accounted for, he will receive credit. 
9. Use of funds for an accountant may be unnecessary since the State has already informed the 
Defendant that it will credit him for all verifiable child support payments. Defendant^ concerns 
about the total child support arrearage may be able to be resolved without cost. 
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WHEREFORE, the State respectfully request that: 
1. The Defendant's Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant be denied, 
OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE 
2. That Defendant be required to provide all alleged proofs of payment to the State for verification 
to see if concerns over the child support arrearage can be resolved without incurring additional costs. 
Dated this '( ? day of March, 2006. 
/ / 
£ - >01 
^Aim Ro^ycki 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion and Order on 
State's Response to Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant, first class mail, postage prepaid, this 
V ^ d a y of 1"\\,(JLAJK 2006, to: 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney at Law 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
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-OZPUTY 
Bryan Sidwell (7625) 
Attorney for Defendant 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
REPLY TO STATE'S 
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR 
FUNDS TO HIRE 
ACCOUNTANT 
Case No. 041800326 FS 
Judge PAYNE 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and replies 
to the State's response to motion for funds to hire accountant. 
FACTS 
1. The Defendant is indigent and has a court appointed attorney and is in need of funds. 
2. The State of Utah has funds to hire full time employees, which have prepared payment 
schedules and amortization charts for the State of Utah. These charts are prepared by State of 
Utah employees in a way that is beneficial to the State of Utah's theory. 
3. The Defendant is indigent and also has theories that he wishes to present at trial, but 
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has no money to hire a witness to prepare the documents. The defendant should be able to hire 
someone that can be a witness at trial that will prepare an amortization schedule that is consistent 
with his theory. 
4. The defendant believes that the payment schedules prepared by the State of Utah are 
inaccurate in several ways. The defendant wishes to have a person prepare several amortization 
schedules that he can present to the jury. 
Conclusion 
If the defendant is not allowed funds to hire an accountant, then the defendant is being 
denied due process by not being allowed to properly prepare a case for trial. The defendant 
requests oral argument. 
DATED this 1D day of AUA<S>L , 2006. 
f^u^q^ Aj-diMJ 
BryanJSidwell 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the 
following by hand delivery on March 27,2006. 
Ann Rozycki 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
6. ^H^^"— • 
Bryan Sidwell 
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Attorneys for the plaintiff 
160 East 300 South 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
MOTION FOR FUNDS TO HIRE 
ACCOUNTANT 
Criminal No. 041800326FS 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
Based upon the foregoing Motion and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Defendant's Motion For Funds to Hire Accountant is denied. 
DATED this H day of fk^u^ . 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
A.LYNNPA1 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 0418 00326 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ANN C ROZYCKI 
ATTORNEY PLA 
160 E 300 S 5TH FLR 
P 0 BOX 140814 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 
84114-0814 
By Hand BRYAN D SIDWELL 
Dated t h i s AiV day o f jyyMKAAJk , 2 0 n\o • 
VWI ULL, 
DeputyyCourt Clerk 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
: RULING 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, : Case No.: 041800326 
Defendant. : 
ulSTBIZT r<->. i— 
^ 'TAHC06N7Y^AW 
- W 3 ! ?;$[> 
The Defendant's Request to Appoint an Accountant is denied. The request does not 
demonstrate how an accountant would assist the Defendant in his defense. The records of the 
State appear to be kept on a computer with no back-up documents to review for accuracy other 
than the Defendant's own records. The State has agreed to give the Defendant credit for any 
payments he has made when he has proof of payment. This record keeping does not require the 
skills of an accountant. 
DATED this
 t V daV of March, 2006. 
BY THE COURT: 
A. LYNN PAYNH^ DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
i St I hereby certify that on the 31 ^ day of March, 2006, true and correct copies of the 
Ruling were mailed, postage prepaid, or hand delivered to: Ms. Ann Rozycki, Assistant Attorney 
General, at P.O. Box 140814, Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0814 and to Mr. Bryan Sidwell, 
Attorney for Defendant, at 134 W. Main, Suite 202, Vernal, UT 84078. 
\^kJ_ 
Deputy Cler] 
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Bryan Sidwell (7625) 
At torney for Defendant 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
MOTION TO SEVER CHARGES 
Case No. 041800326 FS 
Judge PAYNE 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and requests an 
Order severing the charges and granting the defendant separate trials for the counts charged. 
Grounds for such motion are set forth in the support memorandum. 
DATED this 7L> day of ., 2006. 
Bryan Sidwell 
Attorney for Defendant 
1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument was sent to the 
following by hand delivery on March 25,2006. 
Ann Rozycki 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
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Bryan Sidwell (7625) 
Attorney for Defendant 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Utah 84078 
(435) 789-4900 
IN AND FOR THE EIGHTH DISTRICTCOURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
STATE OF UTAH, ) OF MOTION TO SEVER 
CHARGES 
V. 
Plaintiff, ] 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) Case No. 041800326 FS 
) Judge PAYNE 
COMES NOW the defendant, by and through, his attorney Bryan Sidwell and submits the 
following memorandum in support of motion to sever charges. 
FACTS 
1. The defendant divorced Teresa Ann Warden on or about May 22,1990. The 
defendant and Teresa Ann Warden had two children: 
Jillyn E. Horrocks born May 4, 1987 
Kelsey M. Horrocks born September 1988 
2. The State of Utah alleges in count I that the defendant has not provided for the above 
mentioned children and that arrears are owed to Teresa Ann Warden. 
3. After the defendant's divorce to Teresa Ann Warden he married Maria Pincock. They 
FILED 
DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, UTAH 
APR 2 7 20C6 
JOANNE MeKEE, CLERK 
1 
were divorced on or about September 27, 1994, subsequent to this divorce the defendant and 
Maria Pincock remarried and were divorced again on or about May 11, 1988. 
4. Two children were born as issue to the marriage between Maria Pincock and 
defendant to wit: Ashley and Allie. 
5. The State of Utah alleges in Count II that the defendant has not provided for the minor 
children Ashley and Allie, children of Maria Pincock. 
6. The alleged victims in count I and II are different. 
RULE 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same indictment 
or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan. Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure Section 77-8a-l. 
If the court finds one of the above then the court must look to see if joinder prejudices the 
defendant. 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder of 
offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the court 
shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or 
provide other relief as justice requires. 
The analysis is a two part test first is in permissible to join the counts under Utah Code of 
Criminal Procedure section 77-8a-l and the second part does it prejudice the defendant. State v. 
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Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
ANALYSIS 
In the present case the two counts are not connected. There are separate victims 
regarding each alleged count. Although, similar crimes are alleged in each count, the victims, the 
time frame, circumstances and facts surrounding each count is different. 
There is no common scheme. Most crimes are crimes of commission. The person is 
doing some type of prohibited conduct. In such crimes a person may use a common scheme to 
commit the crimes. However, the alleged crimes in this case are different because they are 
crimes of omission, meaning the defendant allegedly did not do something he should have or in 
other words he failed to act. There is no common scheme in this matter. 
Finally, the defendant would be prejudiced if the two counts are not severed. The alleged 
allegation of not paying child support to one ex-wife prejudices the defendant case against the 
other ex-wife and is not relevant. 
CONCLUSION 
Wherefore, the defendant requests that counts I and count II be severed and given 
separate trials. 
DATED this ZL day of __ & O A J ? , 2006. 
iflU^-
Bryaff Sidwell 
Attorney for Defendant 
3 
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Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Bryan" Sidwell 
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Attorneys for State of Utah 
160 East 300 South 
P.O. BOX 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Telephone: (801)366-0199 
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF VERNAL 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
SEVER CHARGES 
Criminal No. 041800326FS 
Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
The State of Utah, through counsel, R. Jason Hanks, Assistant Attorney General, files 
this Response to the Defendant's Motion To Sever Charges and respectfully asks the Court to 
Deny Defendant's Motion based on the following: 
FACTS 
1. Count I of the State's Information alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support 
his children, Jillyn and Eugenie, from August of 1997 through July of 2004. 
2. Count II of the State's Information alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to support 
his children, Ashlie and Allie, from October of 1998 through June of 2004. 
ARGUMENT 
The issue of whether a court must sever charges brought against defendant is governed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999) which in relevant part, states as follows: 
(1) Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged in the same 
indictment or information if each offense is a separate count and if the offenses 
charged are: 
(a) based on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in their 
commission; or 
(b) alleged to have been part of a common scheme or plan .... 
(4) (a) If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is prejudiced by a joinder 
of offenses or defendants in an indictment or information or by a joinder for trial 
together, the court shall order an election of separate trials of separate counts, 
grant a severance of defendants, or provide other relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (1999). 
Additionally, "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is prejudiced by joinder 
is whether evidence of the other crime would have been admissible in a separate trial." State v. 
Meade, 27 P.3d 1115,1130 (Utah 2001) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting State v. Smith. 
927 P.2d 649, 654). 
In both Counts of Mr. Horrock's criminal case, it is alleged that the Defendant committed 
the same conduct, failure to support his children. The Defendant's alleged actions in both Counts 
are connected in their commission by overlapping charging periods. Count I (August of 1997 
through July of 2004) and Count II (October of 1998 through June of 2004) allege time periods 
2 
of criminal non-support that run together for approximately six years. Since these charges cover 
approximately the same time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant committed both 
criminal Counts with the common scheme or plan to pay little or no child support for any of his 
children. The fact that both alleged Counts occurred simultaneously goes to the Defendant's 
motive, intent, plan, and proves lack of mistake in committing both crimes. 
Additionally, the Defendant is not prejudiced by trying both Counts together. As stated 
above, "prejudice" for the purpose of severing charges is shown by whether evidence of the other 
crime would be admissible in a separate trial. S>ee State v. Meade, at 1130. In his Motion To 
Sever Charges, the Defendant does not argue that any of the State's evidence would be 
inadmissible in a separate proceeding and therefore the Defendant's prejudice argument fails. 
It is the State's position that the evidence in both Counts is equally admissible in separate 
proceedings. If the charges were severed and there were separate trials on each Count, the State 
would call the exact same witnesses in both trials, and would be needlessly repeating the same 
evidence. Both Counts should be tried together to promote judicial economy and to conserve 
State resources. 
CONCLUSION 
Counts I and II of the State's Information allege the same conduct, failure of the 
Defendant to support his children, during approximately the same time period, which are part of 
the same common scheme or plan to deny his biological children support. There is no prejudice 
to the Defendant in trying both Counts together. 
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WHEREFORE, the State respectfully requests that the Defendant's Motion be denied by 
the Court. 
Dated this / day of May, 2006. 
R. Jason Hanks 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing State's Response 
to Defendant's Motion to Sever Charges, first class mail, postage prepaid, this day of 
'YH 'VNNA- 2006, to: 
BRYAN SIDWILL 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
134 W MAIN ST #202 
VERNAL UT 84078 
AnnaM. Gamangasso M 
Criminal Non-Support Paralegal/ 
The Law Office of 
BRYAN SID WELL #7625 
Attorney for Defendant 
134 West Main, Suite 202 
Vernal, Ut 84078 
Telephone No.: (435) 789-4900 
Fax. No.: (435) 789-4999 
IN THE EIGHTH DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
UINTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH, ; 
Plaintiff, ; 
vs. ] 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS ; 
Defendant. ] 
) REPLY TO STATE'S RESPONSE TO 
) DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO 
) SEVER CHARGES 
) Case No.: 041800326 FS 
) Judge: A. LYNN PAYNE 
COMES NOW, the defendant, by and through counsel and replies to the State's response 
to Defendant's motion to sever charges. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I 
As stated in the defendant's memorandum to sever, there is no common scheme and 
therefore, the counts cannot be joined. The term common scheme implies that the defendant 
acted in such a way as to intentionally commit the alleged crime in count I and used the same 
plan to commit the alleged crime in count II.. The term common scheme implies an action or a 
crime of commission. There cannot be a common scheme when there is no action. The 
defendant is allegedly charged with two counts, not because he acted, planned or schemed, but 
because he failed to do an act. 
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Point II 
The State of Utah erroneously states the opinion that the evidence in Count I is admissible 
with regard to count II. 
Whether the defendant paid child support to one ex-wife is irrelevant to whether he paid 
child support to a second ex-wife. In the event it is relevant it should be excluded on the grounds 
of prejudice, confusion or waste of time. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 403 states, "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded 
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence." 
The only purpose of using evidence from count I and count 11 is to confuse the jury and 
incite the jury in a negative way toward the defendant. 
Point III 
Finally, the State of Utah argues that trying the two counts together promotes judicial 
economy and conserves State resources. This matter is already set for a two day trial. The trial 
date was set in this manner so that it would either be one two-day trial or two one-day trials. 
Based on the way the trial date was scheduled there is little or no savings to the State by having 
one trial. Further any savings is not outweighed to the damage to the defendant. 
DATED May 09, 2006. 
Bryan ^ idwell  
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
The undersigned hereby certifies that on May 09, 2006, a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing OBJECTION TO DISCOVERY was deposited in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, addressed to: 
R. Jason Hanks 
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor 
P.O. Box 140814 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0814 
Bryan^idwell 
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TREN SHELDON HORROCKS, 
Defendant. 
RULING 
CASE NO. 
JUDGE A. 
041800326 
LYNN PAYNE 
This matter is before the Court on the Defendant's "Motion 
to Sever Charges," filed with the Court on April 27, 2006, and 
accompanied by supporting memorandum. The State's response to 
the Defendant's motion was filed on May 02, 2006. The Court, 
having reviewed the motion, now enters the following ruling on 
the motion. 
This case involves two third-degree felony charges against 
the Defendant for failure to support his children from two sepa-
rate marriages. "A court should sever charges when it concludes 
that prejudice to the defendant outweighs considerations of 
economy and practicalities of judicial administration, with 
doubts being resolved in favor of severance." State v. Smith,, 
927 P.2d 649, 653 (Utah App. 1996). 
Count One alleges that the Defendant knowingly failed to 
support his children, Jillyn and Kelsey, from August 1997 
through July 2004. Count Two alleges that the Defendant know-
ingly failed to support his children, Ashley and Allie, from Oc-
tober 1998 through July 2004. The two sets of the Defendant's 
children result from different marriages. The Defendant has 
filed a motion to sever the charges, arguing that in the present 
case the two counts are not connected in that there are separate 
victims from each alleged count. The Defendant also argues that 
there is no common scheme between the alleged counts. The State 
argues that "since these charges cover approximately the same 
time periods, it is the State's position that Defendant commit-
ted both criminal counts with the common scheme or plan to pay 
little or no child support for any of his children." State's 
Response, pg.3. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (2006) governs this this area of 
law. State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 60 n.8 (Utah 1993). The 
relevant section of the Utah Code states: 
Two or more felonies, misdemeanors, or both, may be charged 
in the same indictment or information if each offense is a 
separate count and if the offenses charged are: (a) based 
on the same conduct or are otherwise connected together in 
their commission; or (b) alleged to have been part of a 
common scheme or plan. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l(l) (2006). In this case, each of the 
offenses brought against the Defendant are separate counts, al-
leged to be part of a common scheme or plan (to avoid paying 
child support for his children). In State v. Lee, 831 P.2d 114 
(Utah App. 1992), the Utah Court of Appeals addressed what was 
required in order to establish a "common scheme or plan" under 
this statute. 
The Lee court first identified that Utah appellate courts 
had not yet interpreted that language under this statute. Lee., 
831 P.2d at 117. Rather, the Utah appellate courts have looked 
to neighboring states for their interpretations. The Arizona 
Supreme Court, in interpreting a rule similar to section 77-8a-
1, held that: "in order for two crimes to be classified as a 
common plan or scheme it is not necessary for the crimes to have 
been perpetrated in an absolutely identical manner, so long as 
the court perceives a visual connection between the two crimes." 
State v. Tipton, 119 Ariz. 386, 581 P.2d 231 (Ariz. 1978). The 
Lee court also cited cases from Idaho and Missouri, both of 
which allowed joinder of two or more claims where both counts in 
the indictment referred to the same type of offense, even where 
the time periods for commission of the separate offenses were 
months apart. See State v. Warren, 717 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. App. 
1986); see also State v. Schwartzmiller, 685 P.2d 830 (Idaho 
1984). In Lee, the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial 
court's conclusion that the alleged crimes were part of a "com-
mon scheme or plan." The Lee court stated, "The parallel fact 
pattern in both incidents plainly demonstrates the existence of 
a calculated plan. 
Later, in State v. Scales, 946 P.2d 377 (Utah App. 1997), 
the Utah Court of Appeals upheld the trial court's decision to 
deny a defendant's motion to sever charges. The defendant had 
been charged with murder and theft. The Scales court stated 
that "to determine whether the trial court complied with section 
77-8a-l, we must interpret it according to the common meaning of 
its plain language." Scales, 946 P.2d at 384-85. The court 
then indicated that "the language of section 77-8a-l is clear." 
Id. The Scales court was convinced that the murder and theft 
charges were part of a common scheme or plan, the thefts facili-
tating flight from the murder scene. 
Therefore, under the plain language of the statute and sup-
porting case law, the statutory requirements for joinder of the 
charges appear to have been met. However, the same statute con-
tinues by stating: 
If the court finds a defendant or the prosecution is preju-
diced by a joinder of offenses or defendants in an indict-
ment or information or by a joinder for trial together, the 
court shall order an election of separate trials of sepa-
rate counts, grant a severance of defendants, or provide 
other relief as justice requires. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-8a-l (4) (a) (2006). This section requires 
the Court to determine whether the parties (either the State or 
the Defendant) would be prejudiced by joinder of the offenses, 
and if prejudice results, the court is to take appropriate ac-
tion. "The initial inquiry regarding whether a defendant is 
prejudiced by joinder is whether evidence of the other crime 
would have been admissible in a separate trial." State v. Mead, 
2001 UT 58, 159 (internal quotations omitted). In Lee., the Utah 
Court of Appeals, in addressing this very question, stated that 
in order to determine whether evidence of one [count] would 
be admissible at a separate trial on the other count, we 
look to Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence. That 
rule provides: 'Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts 
is not admissible to prove the character of a person in or-
der to show that he acted in conformity therewith. It may, 
however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of 
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, 
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.' 
In the case before the Court, evidence of one count would be ad-
missible at a separate trial on the other count for purposes of 
establishing motive, intent, absence of mistake, etc. There-
fore, the Defendant in this case would not be prejudiced by 
joinder of the various counts since evidence of each count would 
be admissible in a trial on either count. 
Finally, a relevant issue in both counts will be the income 
and expenses of the Defendant during the applicable periods of 
time. Because the time periods for each count overlap substan-
tially, Mr. Horrock's obligations and payments to one former 
spouse would be admissible in establishing the ability to pay 
his obligations to the other former spouse. 
The requirements for joinder are met and there does not ap-
pear to be prejudice to the Defendant. For these reasons, the 
Court hereby denies the Defendant's motion to sever. 
Dated this day of fYl<Z~\s , 2006, 
BY THE COURT: 
Ufa 
A. LYNN PAYNE, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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